proved beneficial as well. Many voters doubted the competence of the major opposition party, Labour, while the Liberal Democrats-formerly the principal protest option in British national politics-were in government. Whether another felicitous confluence of issues and circumstances will enable UKIP to be an influential player in the British party system in years ahead remains to be seen.
UKIP's Upward Trajectory
After the 2010 general election UKIP's vote intention share in opinion polls grew substantially, Although many UKIP supporters are former Conservatives, the party has other sources of support. For example, among respondents to the January-April 2014 CMS surveys indicating they intended to vote UKIP in the next general election, over one-quarter had voted either Labour (10.1%) or Liberal Democrat (16.5%) in 2010. Another 4.4% had voted for another party and 17.7% had voted UKIP. This diversity suggests that multiple factors may have motivated a move to UKIP. In the next section we discuss theoretical perspectives on what these factors may be.
Theoretical Perspectives on UKIP Support
One theoretical perspective on support for insurgent right-wing parties identifies a syndrome of economic grievance, socio-cultural threat and political distrust coupled with easily understood policy prescriptions as primary motors of party appeal. Since its founding in 1993, UKIP has portrayed itself as a 'common-sense' party that champions the interests of ordinary people-interests that it claims are subverted by a policy cartel of unresponsive cultural, economic and political elites.
3 According to this populist narrative, these elites dominate Britain's mainstream political parties and they have exposed the country to the predations of an insatiably power-hungry European Union. British citizens are burdened by a host of vexatious regulations promulgated by unelected, unresponsive bureaucrats in Brussels and British culture and economy are threatened by an unceasing flood of immigrants who access the UK via the EU's common labour market. UKIP's prescription for alleviating these problems is straightforwardsevering ties with the EU is essential for restoring Britain's cultural integrity, economic prosperity and political sovereignty.
The backdrop to this argument is the increased loss of control by governments over the levers of policy-making in an increasingly globalised world. Early studies argued that globalization did not fundamentally erode the autonomy of states to pursue independent policies (Rose, 1980; Castles, 1982; Schmidt, 1996; Keman, 2002) . As Garrett put it: 'the impact of electoral politics has not been dwarfed by market dynamics ' (1998: 2) . However, more recent work suggests that an independent monetary policy is not possible in a globalised world (Boix, 1998) and that governmental autonomy for other aspects of policy-making is limited (Garrett, 2000; Caul and Gray, 2000; Huber and Stevens, 2001 ). This general tendency, coupled with the growing importance of policy-making at the EU level (Hix, 2004; Featherstone and Radelli, 2003) , has fed perceptions of 'democratic deficits' whereby voters feel alienated from unresponsive national and EU-wide elected institutions (e.g., Norris, 2011) . National parliaments are seen to have ceded major powers to the EU whose parliament is a distant, multi-national institution subservient to Brussels bureaucrats. Right-wing populism with its emphasis on national control of decision-making is one reaction to these developments-developments given a significant boost by the 'Great Recession' which seriously affected many EU countries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Krugman, 2012; Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2014) .
The importance of anti-EU attitudes for understanding UKIP's rise is a prominent theme in existing research (e.g., Ford and Goodwin, 2014) . Researchers also have explored the socio-demographic and political characteristics of UKIP voters and the party's similarities to and differences from other rightwing parties in Europe (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009; John and Margetts, 2009; Whitaker and Lynch, 2011; Goodwin, 2011, 2014; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012) . In UKIP's case, research indicates that the party's strongest appeal is to older, less well educated men, many of whom are or formerly were in lower status occupations (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: ch. 4) . Regarding political affiliations, a study of voting in the 2009 EU elections reported that the party was more likely to attract disaffected Conservatives than adherents of other parties (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011) . This finding is consistent with the observation that many UKIP supporters formerly voted Conservative. Previous studies indicate that these ex-Conservatives often are Euroskeptics attracted to UKIP by its strident anti-EU rhetoric.
Without gainsaying the significance of anti-EU sentiment for UKIP support, there is a second theoretical perspective that merits attention. Specifically, it may be hypothesized that the British political context after the 2010 election helped UKIP to attract individuals dissatisfied with high levels of immigration and the performance of the economy and key public services such as the National Health
Service. In the language of theories of electoral choice, substantial negativity about the spatial issue of UK membership in the European Union was supplemented by adverse judgments about valence issues concerning the performance of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government and the anticipated performance of the principal opposition party, Labour. 4 A highly skewed public opinion distribution is what distinguishes valence from position issues. In this regard, public opinion surveys indicate that the NHS and immigration join the economy as salient valence issues in contemporary British politics. 5 By providing an option for people concerned with these issues, UKIP expanded its votegathering potential and enhanced its chances of becoming a viable electoral option. UKIP's ability to profit from valence issues owes much to the fact that the traditional catch-all protest party, the Liberal Democrats, joined a coalition government in 2010 and thereby forfeited much of its appeal to voters searching for an alternative to the major parties.
The goal of the present analyses is to explain the dynamics of UKIP support 6 and in the next section we discuss trends in major spatial and valence issues and accompanying party performance judgments that may have benefited UKIP.
Issues and Party Performance
Previous research indicates that electoral choices are influenced by combinations of spatial and valence issues, with the latter typically having larger direct effects than the former (e.g., Clarke et al 2004; Whiteley et al., 2013) . Accordingly, to understand UKIP's surge, it is useful to examine changes in public attitudes about both spatial and valence issues, particularly in the period of economic distress and partisan instability that began shortly after the run on the Northern Rock Bank in September Similarly, when asked to forecast their financial condition in the year ahead, pessimists outnumbered optimists by 32% to 25%.
Many people also expressed unhappiness with party performance on the economy. Figure 4 documents that confidence in the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats on the economy declined substantially (from 52% in June 2010 to 37% in April 2014), whereas positive judgments about Labour remained an exception (e.g., 21% in April 2013). In contrast, the group stating that they did not believe any party was competent or they 'didn't know' which party was competent increased from 25% in June December 2013 (the most recent month for which data on Labour are available), 12% were in the former group and 51% were in the latter. These numbers testify that Labour had gained precious little credit for how it would deal with the issue at time when confidence in the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was deteriorating. In such a circumstance, it is plausible that some voters would consider an option such as UKIP, particularly since the party long had insisted that immigration cannot be controlled while Britain remains in the EU.
( Figure 5 about here)
The National Health Service is a third salient valence issue. The NHS has totemic status in modern British politics and public support for it is extremely strong. However, judgments about the performance of the NHS are decidedly mixed. 9 Attitudes about the health service are important and previous research indicates that they are a useful summary measure for reactions to public service delivery more generally (Clarke et al., 2009: ch. 3) . CMS monthly surveys include questions asking about how the Coalition Government handled, and how a Labour government would have handled, the NHS. Trends in performance judgments after the 2010 general election resemble those for the economy and immigration. Confidence in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition's ability to manage the NHS effectively quickly eroded, but Labour did not benefit-despite the fact that the latter party is the historic architect of the health service and one of its most vocal champions. With the Liberal Democrats in government, widespread reservations about the major parties' performance on the NHS presented another opportunity for an insurgent party such as UKIP.
It also can be argued that UKIP benefited from political events which drew public attention to it.
The party's success in local elections, EU elections and Westminster by-elections, as well as coverage of the party's surge in the polls, generated a flood of publicity. This is important for protest parties such as UKIP that risk confinement to the margins of the political arena-places where many voters normally do not look for alternatives. Such parties can benefit handsomely from the 'oxygen of publicity', particularly when it comes from the enhanced media attention that accompanies sizable increases in support.
Favourable publicity encourages previously inattentive voters to consider what a party like UKIP is saying and, if they like what they hear, it can boost the likelihood that the party will attract additional adherents.
A Dynamic Model of UKIP Support
Given the theoretical considerations discussed above, we specify a model of the aggregate dynamics of UKIP vote intentions as what time series analysts call a GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986; Enders, 2009:143-146) . A GARCH model is essentially an ARMA model for the conditional variance of a series. In the present application, the dynamics of UKIP support are specified to be governed by four sets of factors. First and fundamental is a key spatial issue-attitudes towards Britain's continued membership in the EU. Given that opposition to the EU is at the core of UKIP's issue agenda, we hypothesize attitudes about membership move together in dynamic equilibrium with UKIP support. In the language of time series analysis, EU attitudes and UKIP support cointegrate (Engle and Granger, 1987; Enders, 2009 for voicing racist and homophobic remarks.
The fourth component of the model is a 'GARCH-M' feedback process which captures 'oxygen of publicity' effects generated by volatility in UKIP support. 10 The GARCH-M model class originates in financial economics where increased volatility in the market price of an asset signals growing risk that feeds back to affect the asset's price (e.g., Enders, 2009: ch. 3) . 11 As applied here, it is hypothesized that UKIP support increased when the performance of its major rivals was judged poor enough to generate uncertainty in the minds of the voters and that their attention was drawn to UKIP by publicity surrounding events such as favourable election outcomes and media reports of sizable increases in the party's vote intention share in the polls. Although it would require a large-scale content analysis of media coverage of UKIP over time to study this 'oxygen of publicity' effect directly, we proxy it here using the conditional variance of the error term of the aggregate time series model of the dynamics of UKIP support. The conditional variance is specified as an EGARCH (0,1) process (Nelson, 1991) . Since attitudes towards the EU are hypothesized to be crucial for UKIP support, the EGARCH process itself is modelled such that changes in opinions about EU membership affect volatility in EU support-as EU approval declined, voters reconsidered their electoral options and this was manifested in increased volatility in UKIP support. In turn, this increased volatility created publicity for UKIP that fed back to enhance its support.
To summarize, the general EGARCH-M model of UKIP support is:
where: UKIP t = UKIP vote intention share X = predictor variables including the cointegrating process between UKIP support and EU attitudes, evaluations of the economy, immigration and the NHS, political events σ 2 t = conditional variance of process ε t-i = stochastic error process, ~N(0, σ 2 t ) β, λ, θ = coefficients to be estimated
The conditional heteroscedasticity component is:
where: ζ's = coefficients to be estimated EU t = attitudes towards EU at time t
Model parameters are estimated using monthly CMS data gathered over the April 2004 to April 2014 period (N = 121).
As a preliminary step, we specify a baseline model that includes only attitudes about EU membership.
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This model (Model A) helps us to ascertain whether EU attitudes and UKIP vote intentions move together in the long-term and it is the foundation for the more elaborate EGARCH specification (see equation 1 above) that follows. In equation form, Model A is:
where: UKIP t is UKIP vote intention share EU t are attitudes towards the EU β 0 , β 1 , β 2 and α are parameters to be estimated ε t is a stochastic error term, ~N(0, σ
In this specification, β 0 is an intercept and β 1 estimates the short-run impact of changes in EU attitudes on changes in UKIP vote intentions. The coefficient α measures the speed at which shocks are dissipated by the cointegrating relationship between UKIP vote intentions and EU attitudes that is represented by the error correction mechanism (UKIP t-1 -β 2 EU t-1 ). 13 If UKIP support and EU attitudes cointegrate, α will carry a negative sign and vary between 0 and 1 in absolute value, with larger values indicating more rapid adjustment (Enders, 2009: ch. 6 ). As argued above, this cointegrating relationship is expected given that Euro-scepticism motivated UKIP's creation and has remained the core element in party policy. The more elaborate EGARCH specification (Model B) adds predictor variables measuring judgments about three key valence issues-the economy, immigration and the NHS. 14 Model B also includes dummy variables indexing EU and Westminster elections and other salient events described above, 15 as well as the EGARCH-M feedback variable that indexes effects of increased volatility in UKIP support.
We first consider Model A, the basic error correction specification that addresses the hypothesis that attitudes about the EU and UKIP support travelled together in dynamic equilibrium. The model enables us to assess both the short-and long-run effects of changes in EU attitudes on UKIP vote intentions. Short-term effects are estimated by β 1 , the coefficient for the variable measuring change in attitudes about EU membership from time t-1 to time t. The strength of the tendency of UKIP vote intentions and EU membership to travel together in the long run is captured by the α coefficient discussed above.
( benefited from volatility in its support, with this effect interpreted as indicating the importance of the 'oxygen of publicity' for a small party trying to establish itself as a viable electoral option.
Conclusions: UKIP Dynamics Reconsidered
Over This economic negativity was reinforced by unflattering judgments about the Government's performance delivering key public services, notably the National Health Service.
It is a stylised fact in the political economy literature that negative evaluations of a government's performance bolster support for opposition parties. However, after the 2010 general election, Britain's principal opposition party, Labour, was unable to leverage the sour public mood for political advantage, largely because its reputation for managerial competence had been seriously tarnished by being in office when the economic crisis began. Compounding this problem Labour Leader Ed Miliband failed to make a convincing case that he could restore prosperity and protect vital public services. 19 For their part, the Liberal Democrats traditionally have presented themselves as a viable option for anyone unhappy with the two major parties. But, after the 2010 election the Liberal Democrats negated their protest appeal by joining the Conservatives in government. This created an opening in the political choice set which helped UKIP to portray itself as the real opposition.
Benefiting from intertwined anti-EU and anti-immigrant sentiments and the effects of a deep and protracted economic recession, UKIP and similar parties elsewhere in Europe have performed quite well in recent years. The effects of these spatial and valence issues have been magnified to the extent that populist parties have been able to make a case that their rivals are integral parts of an ineffective and unresponsive political establishment. In Britain the presence of a coalition government involving the traditional protest party, the Liberal Democrats, facilitated this argument. Elsewhere in Europe, coalition governments are common and it may be conjectured that this has helped populist parties to advance their claims to be the real 'none of the above' option.
When considering the future prospects of right-wing populist parties, it is apparent that these parties have only very limited ability to control their fates. Although they may take advantage of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments by making anti-EU arguments, they have little or no influence on the many of the contextual or valence forces at work. The composition or even the presence of coalition governments that define the choice sets encountered by electorates are circumstances these parties can influence to only a very limited extent. In addition, other than selecting attractive leaders and voicing suspicions about the competence and motives of the powers that be, there is little the populist parties can do to affect valence politics considerations that influence electoral choice. Nor can the populist parties control the positions that major parties take on issues such as EU membership or immigration that are central to the former's appeal. As a result, it seems likely that the prospects of UKIP and other right-wing populist parties will be largely determined by a mixture of forces beyond their control. They may benefit from these forces, but they can do little to shape them.
Looking forward in the British context, the forthcoming referendum on continued membership in the EU presents UKIP with an opportunity and a threat. The opportunity is obvious, as the referendum is about the party's core issue, and UKIP will have a chance to campaign as the only true champion of all those who support 'Brexit'. The threat is equally obvious. If Britain should decide to stay in the EUespecially if the verdict is decisive-this could take 'Europe' off the political agenda for the foreseeable future. With its signature issue put paid, the party could very well find itself in serious difficulty. Less obvious, but also important will be the operation of valence issues such as the economy, immigration and health care in the changed political context of a Conservative majority government pursuing an austerity agenda. Studying how these various factors affect the dynamics of UKIP support before and after the referendum will help analysts to gain a fuller understanding of the forces that govern the party's fortunes.
In particular, the referendum context and its aftermath should provide researchers with valuable opportunities to learn more about how the 'oxygen of publicity'-and the possible lack thereof-affects the dynamics of UKIP support in the British electorate.
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